Steamdeck sold like 6m units, maybe valve gets a few 100m more selling OLED markup, but I feel like that's kind of peanuts for Valve who would rather push the platform. With price of PC these days and disenfranchisement with windows, I think Valve would rather have Steamdeck be Switch.
25% interception rate on shit tier Kinzhals last year, which allegedly required salvoing all 32 interceptors from patriot battery, a patriot pac3 mse, aka the most advanced operational variant from 10 years ago. It's dropped to 6% now after RU improvement.
Math basically saying ~10 kinzhals can overwhelm typical carrier group with couple flight3 Burkes assuming all Burke VLS was dedicated to ABM, which it's not. Extrapolate to a more performant PRC hypersonic, and interception rate might approach 0. There's nothing in US missile defense tests (staged ballistic trajectories / simple decoys) that remotely suggest they have capable interceptors or the magazine depth to survive even moderate amount of high end hypersonics. Which is going to proliferate, see PRC building $100k commodity hypersonics for potential floor. Bundle that with space ISR and expeditionary navy model is even more dead in 10-15 years.
Hence IMO it's rational USnavy modernization/recapitalization is such a shit show. US legislatively locked in 11 carrier navy with all the supporting surface fleet that entails. Shit needs to be built, by law, but there's nothing competent to build in face of AShM math, so keep grafting and fucking around. It's not like USN acquisitions wasn't shit fucked before Trump.
All of US MIC acquisition behavior makes sense if one accepts that navy is probably fucked (including subsurface), the only thing US really needs for hegemony (excluding PRC containment, which US functionally can't), is 100-200 B21s (naval tacair/rip f/a-xx likely also fucked) to bomb whatever mid sized countries they want with impunity without putting surface fleet at risk (imagine Houthis with hypersonics). Any legacy naval hulls, tacair frames with some modernization will still black magic overmatch vs everyone except PRC for peacetime dick measuring. TLDR USN can't do anything against PRC, but doesn't have to do anything VS everyone else. So USN does whatever it wants, which includes a lot of flailing because it doesn't really know what to do at all.
I don't think that taking interception rate as the only metric is fair. RU missiles have shown pretty low precision - and hitting a moving ship is much harder than hitting a stationary building, at least in my imagination.
Yes, hence RU missile shit tier, they can hit point targets at least, which is step above IR missile that is dog shit tier, area spam. Maybe IR high end stuff RU tier if we can disambiguate the recent UAE hit that is statistically suggest low CEP point target capability.
For PRC missiles, see tandem missile demonstration a few years ago, two missiles launched from different launch sites coordinated to hit moving ship at sea. AKA PRC already have the ISR / kill chain to hit moving ships synced to time and space. Something basically no one else has demonstrated. Now extrapolate that out 10 years, while they (and US) are proliferating spaced based C4ISR = basically any surface fleet anywhere is dead, and even if we downgrade to only static targets, that means all US logistics, i.e. unrep are dead which leaves surface fleet single deployment assets. DDG barely has enough endurance for a few days of high tempo operations (fuel and weapons), carriers has endurance but without replenishment, no ammo, and without DDG escorts no protection.
As I understand it, hypersonics only got the focus they did in russia and china because US missile defence had evolved to the point where it was too much of a threat to existing ballistic missiles. No fundamental reason to think hypersonics won't in turn suffer the same fate.
They transitioned to hypersonic development after US withdrew from ABM treaty in early 2000s, historically moving to hypersonic was not reaction to US having a working shield (it didn't), it was more proactive move demonstrate US pursuing missile shield is likely not ever going to be viable. It took another 15+ years for US ABM tests to consistently intercept ballistics, and even then under very favourable (scripted), not operational conditions, i.e. FTM44 in 2020 was first time US intercepted an "ICBM representative" target. Current US ABM defense #s is not remotely credible threat vs salvo medium/high end ballistics, i.e. current US has ~50 GMDs, it functionally doesn't matter for strategic level exchanges.
For theatre/tactical performance, again early Kinzhal was functionally ballistic and interception rate was ~25%, dropped to 6% when RU added some terminal maneuvering. So US has not only not caught up to ABM defense outside of North Korea tier threats, ABM defense currently on trend to lose the physics race (against capable adversaries). There are fundamental physical reason high end hypersonics will likely only extend the interception gap. The TLDR is terminal speed past mach 6+, the intercept window compresses so much it becomes almost mechanically impossible for interceptors, i.e. g-load on interceptors will physically break them apart. Kinzhal (which US/PRC categorize as ballistic tier) terminal is ~mach4, PRC DFs (US categorize as proper hypersonic) are estimated to sustain mach 5-10, i.e. high machs until final seconds, basically physically impossible engagement envelopes. DEW doesn't have dwell time vs hypersonic already shielded against plasma sheath. Current golden shield bet is on glide phase interceptors, which doesn't really answer magazine math, i.e. multiple expensive interceptors (especially midcourse) is going to lose the attrition game regardless, maybe not vs smaller adversaries, but vs PRC. Extra lopsided in context of naval defense with limited magazine depth where it's not even about $$$ but inability to defend against saturation.
> TLDR USN can't do anything against PRC, but doesn't have to do anything VS everyone else.
Eh the USN can still maintain superiority outside of the South China Sea which means control of global trade. It’s not like it’s useless or anything even if the Taiwan straight turns into a dead zone or if the USN has to worry about missiles from the Chinese mainland. China also has to worry about missiles hitting their mainland industrial centers and naval facilities too.
Look at DoDs China report last few years, specifically PRC fielded conventional strike. PRC DF26, H6xCJ20s already can hit every essential SLOC from Malacca to MENA at volume, DF27 reaches west coast and Europe. There isn't really anywhere except Atlantic (and south America) where USN can operate permissively, i.e. every shipping lane PRC needs (for energy in next 10 years) is already covered. As for missiles hitting mainland, we're really talking about attritional game, PRC A2D2 works as advertised and they can potentially blunt much of the fires from being deliverable to mainland, and there's also sheer scale asymmetry, i.e. PRC pouring more concrete in 10 years than US in past 100. That's just a stupendous amount of infra to break. Meanwhile DF27 can hit west coast, in a few years they'll have DF27+ that reach most of CONUS. The real question then is who can deliver more fires, can win attrition game, can reconstitute faster. And vs PRC, it may not be US considering they put so much fires generation on carriers that may not be able to deliver any munitions under PRC A2D2 and the 30-40 B21 replacement (we're talking 10 years out) barely replaces one carrier in fire power. Meanwhile PRC has global strike eggs is mostly in mainland based ICBMs that skips entire delivery vehicle middle man and can potentially hit CONUS and everything in between with high survivability. And ample surplus industry/construction sector to rebuild. The TLDR is once hemispheric hypersonic proliferates more, USN can't operate permissively in any of the theatres PRC really cares about.
But again that doesn't mean USN can't operate permissively vs literally anyone else, even on legacy platforms that still grossly overmatches every other adversary regardless of acquisition malpractice.
> Meanwhile DF27 can hit west coast, in a few years they'll have DF27+ that reach most of CONUS.
> Meanwhile PRC has global strike eggs is mostly in mainland based ICBMs that skips entire delivery vehicle middle man and can potentially hit CONUS and everything in between with high survivability.
You are just describing nuclear war here, which seems unrealistic to me. China knows they’ll lose ocean access and trade will be stoped, which means no oil, hence why they’ve gone all-in in EVs and “green” technology. Piping in oil from Russia or whatever is a fantasy - pipelines will just get blown up.
Chinese missiles flying all over the world to sink blue water naval ships also seems unrealistic to me. They have to find the ships, for starters. This is a feat much more sensible in and around the Taiwan Straight or the South China Sea. But in your excitement you are forgetting that while certainly China can rain down missiles on enemy forces in the region, those same enemies can strike back too. Or are these hypersonic missiles so scary and advanced and all allied forces will just have to sit quietly while their military and industrial equipment is bombed? If that’s the case, what’s China waiting for?
>
Look at DoDs China report last few years, specifically PRC fielded conventional strike.
Could you link to a specific paper or report that you are referring to? I read these from time to time.
You described nuclear war first with mainland conventional strikes. Regardless, 2025 DoD china report lists fielded conventional strikes with west coast on the map for a reason, they are formally acknowledging CONUS conventional vulnerability. There's popular discourse that CONUS ICBM strikes = nuke back, but that's like saying mainland cruise missile strikes = nuke back. Afterall US cruise missiles are nuclear capable (i.e. what Trump explicitly wants for Trump / Defiant class) and US cruise missiles designed for terrain hugging to minimize detection time, no different than low ICBM response time. Reality is, once conventional CONUS vulnerability exists, the hit me and get nuked bluster no longer holds. US planners now has to account for CONUS strikes... hence why golden dome is a thing, nice piece of security theatre for masses when PRC ability to hit CONUS becomes unavoidable. Like folks can dismiss it as Trumps ego project, but it coincides with US military officials informally acknowledging CONUS vulnerability in media last few years, now made formal with new PRC fielded conventional strike map.
>knows they’ll lose ocean access
Do they, or do they know they can dismantle USN ability to SLOC blockade, especially energy routes. Mind you US can still use CENTCOM forces and political leverage to prevent MENA producers from selling, but this subject is about navy and current PRC rocketry A2D2 is likely in position to prevent US from SLOC blockade.
>pipelines will just get blown up
Yes, incidentally the 2025 Chinese conventional strike map covers Albertan oil infra to US... reminder US still imports 30% oil due to refinery mismatch.
> all over the world... find the ships, for starters
See PRC launching 100s of ISR sats last few years, SCS has persistent coverage already, but now rest of world has decent coverage by this point too. Either way context is 5-10 year mega constellation roll out by which time there very resilient and redundant will be global ISR / kill chain. Their space infra has already moved beyond backyard in last few years.
>same enemies can strike back
Sure but in what volume? Enough to win attrition game? It's not just hypersonics, see PRC acquiring 1m+ loitering munitions, separate order from 1m+ drones, likely shaheed tier with 1IC coverage. Hypersonics for high end assets, there's stupendous low/mid end mop up fires asymmetry to dismantle industrial base within 1-2IC. PRC has the munition depth to win the attrition game. The side with most fires bandwidth can feasibly dismantle adversary ability to fire back. All this from mainland platforms significantly more survivable because PRC doctrine assumes being hit and designed to keep hitting back. At some point the theatre aimpoint math becomes self evident, PRC by virtue of simply being a massive country with ample hardened targets is in position to survive being hit while their adversaries are not. PRC adversaries has less fires to deal with more targets, PRC vice versa, i.e. PRC can be wounded, adversaries will be overkilled. This one of the most glaring asymmetries, i.e. US planners cannot get JP to disperse or harden.
> waiting for
PRC isn't trigger happy, either way every year that passes PRC position in theatre gets stronger, but most importantly autarky and global strike capacity also increases. i.e. in about 10 years, coal to olefin (petchem) and EV penetration trend lines will make PRC close to oil independent, - their energy autarky will exceed US domestic oil who won't fix refinery mixmatch in same time period. Which circles back to CAN/US pipeline vulnerability. Energy autarky mismatch probably most important consideration, even if PRC can break USN SLOC blockade, as I mentioned, US has other tools to disrupt MENA energy flows. Other capabilities like mega constellation ISR increasing prompt global strike coordination, surging SSN and XXLUUV output, lots of reasons to wait and build up. Ideally build up so asymmetry so obvious US compelled to leave East Asian on her own. That's the ultimate prize, not just TW>
see page 85 for fielded conventional strike. You can compare past report map, the new one doesn't even bother labelling 1/2iC anymore because those defense lines are functionally dead vis a vis PRC procurements last few years.
I don’t think so, because if China invades Taiwan or takes similar enough action, and the United States and Japan come to the defense of Taiwan, an attack on the continental United States would not just be disproportionally stupid, but it would be an escalatory mistake as well, because you’ve now just declared actual war on the United States versus your more ‘limited’ war with the aim of only taking Taiwan. You see the difference, right?
But for China to attack Taiwan and the US and Japan to strike Chinese forces, it sort of requires China to then strike US and allied forces throughout the entire region. Attacking Kadena or even striking mainland Japanese industrial facilities, shipyards, &c. And then facing retaliatory strikes on Chinese industrial-military targets seems about to be fair game, and of course China doesn’t view the loss or usage of human capital in the same way that western countries do. I don’t think such a scenario here immediately results in nuclear war, even if the mainland is struck unless the US or Japan start targeting first/second strike capabilities or cause mass civilian casualties. The reason being, well, China would have struck US and Japanese bases first. And frankly if they don’t do that in the opening salvo of the war they’re stupid anyway.
> Do they, or do they know they can dismantle USN ability to SLOC blockade, especially energy routes.
They can’t. This is nonsense.
> Yes, incidentally the 2025 Chinese conventional strike map covers Albertan oil infra to US... reminder US still imports 30% oil due to refinery mismatch.
Sure, in the unlikely scenario that China also attacks Canada (might as well attack everyone at this point), yes US imports go down causing consumer harm, but China’s oil imports drop to 0. When you think about attrition you have to consider attrition for both sides, not just one. China has gone all-in on “green” tech precisely because they cannot win in a war in which they are dependent on oil - see US actions in Venezuela and the Middle East.
> See PRC launching 100s of ISR sats last few years, SCS has persistent coverage already, but now rest of world has decent coverage by this point too. Either way context is 5-10 year mega constellation roll out by which time there very resilient and redundant will be global ISR / kill chain. Their space infra has already moved beyond backyard in last few years.
Ok and the US does that too over the next 5-10 years (assuming capabilities don’t exist today, though they likely do). Now what? China hasn’t really gained an advantage here, launching missiles all over the world could be misconstrued as a nuclear attack and requiring a nuclear response. Is China going to launch missiles at Bahrain, UAE, Korea, the EU, and everyone else? Doesn’t seem realistic.
> PRC isn't trigger happy, either way every year that passes PRC position in theatre gets stronger, but most importantly autarky and global strike capacity also increases. i.e. in about 10 years, coal to olefin (petchem) and EV penetration trend lines will make PRC close to oil independent, - their energy autarky will exceed US domestic oil who won't fix refinery mixmatch in same time period. Which circles back to CAN/US pipeline vulnerability. Energy autarky mismatch probably most important consideration, even if PRC can break USN SLOC blockade, as I mentioned, US has other tools to disrupt MENA energy flows. Other capabilities like mega constellation ISR increasing prompt global strike coordination, surging SSN and XXLUUV output, lots of reasons to wait and build up. Ideally build up so asymmetry so obvious US compelled to leave East Asian on her own. That's the ultimate prize, not just TW
You’re right about two things: China will get stronger and more capable, and it will be less reliant as a country on oil, but you still can’t fly jet fighters with EV batteries and the wealthy markets (EU, US) are turning away from EVs as domestic policy and spending money securing rare earth refining capabilities. All the time you give to China also has to be given to other countries to react and plan too - which I think is often overlooked because western news rants about western failures all day but can’t speak mandarin and don’t have a clue about China’s issues as well.
But I think what you’re wrong about here is the threat, precisely because you are providing a contradiction. There are two geopolitical things that matter here. One is Taiwan as part of the first island chain - I.e. good for US monitoring of Chinese naval activity, and second, the semiconductors.
The longer China waits, the less important Taiwan is to the US. It can build other facilities, semiconductor manufacturing can be invested away from Taiwan too. And as you are asserting, I think, allows the Chinese navy to go and operate in the Pacific with impunity. Frankly I don’t know why they care if the US knows where their ships are anyway. What’s the point of the forces when we don’t have any interest in war in the first place? Does China want to spend this money and then launch missiles at Houthi rebels? Be my guest.
But what exactly does that matter in the world you’ve described? For all of these things to happen on a longer timeframe, the US doesn’t have to “leave” Asia. What is China going to do if the US keeps a base in Japan or the Philippines? Bomb it? Ah ok, well now the US has also built hypersonic missiles and all of these capabilities (because we already have them today anyway) and now if they attack US forces the US gets to do the scary boogeyman thing that you’re asserting China can do and blow up all of their ships with indefensible missiles strikes because they know where all the ships are “because satellites”.
I just do not find “China attacks everything the US has ever built and successfully destroys it and there is nothing the US can do” very convincing.
Thanks for sharing the paper by the way. I’ll take a look. I have a book to finish and at 100 pages it’ll take me a little bit of time to peruse :)
Why assume PRC attacks US+co first? This 2015s talking point based on limited PLA modernization, use it or lose it force structure, so they would be smart to use first, then. 2025+ reality is PRC has survivable fires complex to dismantle 1/2IC anytime. They're in position to bait US+co into firing first if they want. BTW US coming to assist TW is already declaring full scale war over Chinese sovereignty / territory, there's no difference if US wants to limit (i.e. prevent landings) because TW scenario is full war scenario where PRC gets vote in escalation, western analytic conflation over limited/regional war is (mis)attribution to PRC previously not able to prosecute a broader war, but PRC will always prosecute the largest possible war relative to capability over TW, and now that includes CONUS. Sure PRC GAZAing JP/SKR, obviously JP/SKR will want to counter strike mainland, but that opens CONUS to attack and frankly that's a US alliance management problem, because ultimately broader war is net good for PRC strategic stretch goals - to kick US out east asia, that can really only be done by physically dismantling US basing in region, bonus if it deindustrialized JP/SKR who are peacetime competitors vs PRC, who again, is structured to retain more industrial base and reconstitute faster.
>This is nonsense
This is 2025, I mention 2025 DoD report for a reason. Look at the rocketry coverage - encompasses all SLOCs from PRC cost to MENA + 1500km, i.e. standoff carrier range. It's time to stop coping. USN surface fleet is on paper not survivable anymore, pentagon paper. Again once people accept reality of hemispheric hypersonic A2D2, everything about incompetent USN procurement makes sense. This has been obvious for years btw, those missiles exist pre 2025, the latest report just decided to acknowledge reality.
>hasn’t really gained an advantage here
Advantage is massive. First it closes disadvantage, US already has global strike expeditionary model. PRC equalizing = US losing advantage. PRC having more survivable and high-end fires = PRC can hit anywhere on earth globally within hour using purely mainland platforms not vulnerable to disruption, unlike US carriers/bombers with long logistics tail. This advantage potentially step down from rods from god. BTW US can have this too in SSGN with CPS, but we talking about a few 100 VLS tubes that needs days/weeks of prepositioning vs 10000s from PRC mainland.
>going to launch missiles
You know how US gets to simply bomb non nuclear countries with impunity. The answer is PRC gets that privilege too, if war vs US escalates, all global US military assets are on the table. Countries are going to weigh if US protection worth the risk and when they see US simply can't protect they have choices to make, yes this means US nuke umbrella gets will get tested.
> oil imports drop to 0.
> China’s issues as well
> other countries to react and plan too
What's PRC energy production composition? They make 4m+ million barrels, enough to cover all industrial use, i.e. they can run current industrial output on purely domestic oil alone. USN uses like 100k oil per day, PRC domestic production can sustain 40 USNs in perpetuity, they don't need to electrify 6gen. Most oil is used for transportation, of which really diesel is critical (freight). That's where their 1-2 million barrel of CTO equivalents, i.e. they can displace industrial oil with coal to maintain trucking fleet and ration consumer transport oil. How much transport disruption is function of EV penetration, right now a lot in 10 years, minimal. Reminder PRC is actually a continental size power with huge energy assets, not as much as US relative to population, but enough to prosecute forever war with PRC industrial base, i.e. the one that already outproduces everyone combined (as materially not value add). PRC is not Japan, PRC has functionally infinite resources and current mismatch is something that can and is being engineered around. PRC is also not west, because they have industrial base to build a lot of hammers, and eventually hammers get used. PRC is obviously not VZ/MENA who can't hit US back, while PRC can. IMO face PRC realities before fixating on PRC issues. As for other countries reaction/plan, it's factored in, reality is we know what level of infra expansion or acquisition west is capable of, we know PRC china speed trendlines, hence limit extrapolation to reasonable 10 year timeframe.
> two geopolitical things that matter here
> don’t have any interest in war in the first place
US+co seems to have interest in intervening in Chinese civil war, which itself exists due to US support over last 70 years. There's a world where US facilitates peaceful reunification on PRC terms and maybe PRC can live with relatively benign US hanging around in east Asia. But if transition not peaceful, then there is every reason to simply kick US out of east Asia. This key distinction, TW is political goal, kicking US out of east asia is geopolitical / regional hegemony goal. That's the overarching geopolitics that matters. Spheres of influence and all that.
> China attacks everything the US has ever built and successfully destroys it and there is nothing the US can do” very convincing.
It's very convincing because the flip side is US can likely destroy PLAN as well. When I say surface fleet is dead, I include PRC / everyone. The problem is USN likes to launch missiles at Houthis, US global security posture is predicated on survivable expeditionary navy. PRC is not. After both sides lose their boats, US loses most strategic posture, while PRC can rebuild faster. The point is US posture is uniquely vulnerable, because of course it is, PRC spend last 30 years specifically dismantling US force structure. US force structure have been distracted by GWOT, procurement drama... and just geopolitical reality of PRC industrial base, has having difficulty doing the opposite.
Because the US has no interest in a war with China?
Actually attacking the US is literally the worst possible idea for China though. They can win a short, high-intensity war over Taiwan and leverage US political chaos and dysfunction to achieve their goals, but attacking the actual United States would quickly, and cohesively force the United States to get its shit together.
I don’t have any illusions about American Exceptionalism, but China’s strengths in manpower and manufacturing capacity don’t have the leverage that you think they do when a land-oriented power (China) has to engage in warfare with a naval and air-based power. China middling oil production would be destroyed by US missiles and it would be unable to import more oil. That’s a big problem that a land-based power isn’t going to be able to easily overcome. But I guess as you say “China has missiles, China blow up all US forces everywhere” or something like that.
And even winning a war doesn’t “kick” the US out of East Asia. They can just maintain existing bases and naval forces. What’s China going to do about it? Are you going to bomb Japan and Korea? Launch missiles at Saudi Arabia since they aren’t selling you any more oil? The scenario you are fantasizing about which is effectively “China rains down missiles on everything and nobody can do anything about it” is really just not realistic and you keep assuming that other countries don’t have missiles or capabilities or the ability to cause significant harm to Chinese interests.
If you really believe that China launching an invasion of Taiwan (I don’t care if it’s an internal affair or not, China takes action against the US and we just sell Taiwan weapons and take actions against China and so forth) legitimizes striking the continental United States none of this technology you’re talking about matters because your argument is basically “everything escalates to nuclear war” so what does anyone care about how much the US or China wastes on military assets?
But China doesn’t have any intentions of seeing its civilization destroyed, nor does the US, so once you take nuclear war off the table, you have to manage escalation to avoid nuclear war, which is why China is building so many surface ships.
> When I say surface fleet is dead, I include PRC / everyone. The problem is USN likes to launch missiles at Houthis, US global security posture is predicated on survivable expeditionary navy. PRC is not. After both sides lose their boats, US loses most strategic posture, while PRC can rebuild faster. The point is US posture is uniquely vulnerable, because of course it is, PRC spend last 30 years specifically dismantling US force structure. US force structure have been distracted by GWOT, procurement drama... and just geopolitical reality of PRC industrial base, has having difficulty doing the opposite.
The PLAN doesn’t know how to fight a war. The GWOT and similar operations are done so the United States can continue to make sure everything works, logistics concerns are ironed out, and more. There are other reasons for these engagements, of course.
I don’t really accept your theory the Chinese military will just launch missiles and blow up all USN ships, which I think is a fundamental disagreement here and I am not convinced by your writing to change my mind.
> US+co seems to have interest in intervening in Chinese civil war, which itself exists due to US support over last 70 years.
China overplayed its hand with the seizure of Hong Kong, restricting rare earth exports from Chinese refineries, and so-called wolf warrior diplomacy. It had a very easy path to assimilate Taiwan without bloodshed but now it’s going to have to fight over it do no real good reason. The US and Americans in general don’t really care too much about Taiwan, and had China just continued to be a good partner and showed kindness toward Taiwan it would have won the long game and convinced Taiwan to rejoin peacefully. It’s really unfortunate. The US and China don’t need to fight, but I think Xi Jingpin specifically and China’s posture generall has caused the US to have to support Taiwan instead. There are a long list of grievances both sides can legitimately levy at each other, but I think China was the one to rekindle the issue while the US was thinking hey let’s all just trade and get along. I know you’ll disagree but I’ve reviewed enough of the history of both countries and the region to know that this is the case.
What is fuss over US coming to TW defense then? US wants to prevent PRC reunification regardless of method, that's ample reason for war. If US doesn't want war, just have state department tell PRC TW is internal problem.
> get its shit together
How, it takes years to build up modern atrophied industrial base + workforce. It will take even longer to degrade PRC industrial base. Reminder US vs Iraq took 5 carrier groups, favourable regional basing and unsustainably high tempo permissive operations 6 weeks to dismantle Iraq... scale that to PRC size... charitably 500x more industrially capable than Iraq with greater tech base, it will take US+co decades, and US MIC was much better capitalized then, and US industry more productive (as in actual material production not value add). Meanwhile, US basing and posture vs PRC is significantly worse than Iraq, i.e. relative fire generation ability is even worse at standoff range, assuming it even exists. It is innumerate thinking US+co can substantially degrade PRC knowing basic numbers. Either way this is dependant on PRC mainland being hit, is US going to permit mainland attacks from 1IC? What if PRC creams JP, PH for using basing to undermine PRC efforts? Attacking via proxies isn't some magical lifehack that keeps CONUS safe, especially with US basing. This isn't UKR where US has deniability shipping shit from Poland. Hitting mainland from theatre with US basing opens proportional CONUS attack.
> land oriented
Who cares? It's not about land/sea/air oriented, it's about long range strikes oriented, just because PRC doesn't double down on supremely vulnerable legacy navy/airforce to project fires doesn't mean they cannot prosecute long range fires. Again this is 2025, that 8000km DF27 land attack to CONUS exist for a reason. Other missiles to hit tankers/unrep within stand off range etc all the logistics chain that USN and USAF depends to even operate in theatre. There's a reason why is DDGX and FAXX getting the ugly step child treatment, because none of them or their sustainment are survivable in their platform range. When US depend on middle platform to deliver fires, and those middle platforms cannot operate because their even more vulnerable sustainment goes boom, US muh boats and planes is at massive long range fires disadvantage over "land" based fires that simply skips middlemen. And PRC gets to do that precisely because they have industrial base to make disposable single shot long range fires economical.
Extrapolate to land attack US infra with modest DF27 upgrade, that's all of CONUS oil infra going boom too. Everything US can do to PRC, PRC can do to US in short term, if not already because DoD reports tend to be behind the times. Who do you think will fare better then? PRC with 4x more energy infra for US to strike and magnitude more distributed energy infra. So yes, of course the answer is more missiles because PRC prompt global strike explicitly to attack CONUS strategic targets conventionally was written in PLA future doctrine as far back as 2010s. They explicitly are circumventing vulnerable naval fires for global fires straight from mainland because they understand US Navy+airfoce expeditionary model is shit fucked, having spent 20 years building all the tools to dismantle it. Meanwhile, US institutionally locked into shit fucked model, because again, by law US cannot divest from it.
>bomb Japan and Korea
Yes? If US drawn into TW scenario, escalation logic incentivized to align with geopolitical logic, which is to displace US out of east Asia, which calls for bombing JP/SKR/PH or anyone that assists US materially. They are absolutely on the menu because the gains are huge. As for Saudi + others, just US bases if they contribute to undermining PRC interests. If oil ain't flowing to PRC because US pressure, then remove US pressure. Again note all of CENTCOM is in PRC missile range, that is by design.
>nobody can do anything about it
Did I say that? I said PRC will receive counter fire, but not at scale vs what PRC can dish out. Nobody can do _enough_ about it, that's patently realistic when you look at stockpiles and force balance. Go back to the Iraq example. Now realize PRC has magnitude more than US+co in firepower targeted at JP/SKR/PH etc than US+co has via Iraq.
>escalates to nuclear war
Because I don't think it will. I think it's frankly cope rhetoric US delulus themselves into thinking US can maintain presence in another upcoming hegemons backyard because nukes. That bluff is going to get called because alternative is ceding regional hegemony aspirations forever because US cray cray and will nuke if they can't preposition on other side of globe. BTW PRC went to war with USSR, US in KR, shadow fought France in IndoChina, threated UK over HK, border skirmish with India, aka almost every nuclear state, over strategic considers much less important than TW. US threatening nukes vs PRC over TW isn't credible, nuclear umbrella isn't going to save JP/SKR/PH if they assist US in TW.
>China is building so many surface ships
But they're not? They have 300x military shipyard capacity than US, with CSCC producing more tonnage than ALL US postwar shipbuilding, a period where US was rolling out full carriers every year. PRC not doing that, they are keeping an absolutely modest navy relative to their productive capability. PRC military ship building is <1% of total shipbuilding capacity, every other naval power was dedicating 20-50% during peacetime. PRC match low end of that they're launching 80 carriers a year with dry docks sized to fit. PRC naval acquisition is best described as cautiously sufficient for regional overmatch, i.e. be more powerful than US+co in PRC backyard where they need peacetime presence. There's a reason rocket force is the most prestigious / pillar and reported directly to CMC before recent reforms.
>GWOT
C'mon you think GWOT built any surface warfare competency, see Yemen, see 7th fleet crashing left and right. It's negative experience, history has show correct doctrine + training > legacy experience time and time again.
>don’t really accept your theory... change mind
Don't? I'm not here to change your mind. This is public for others to draw conclusions based on argument.
>rejoin peacefully
Let's not pretend US isn't funding NGOs and various political groups to spike peaceful reunion efforts before HK. Reality post US sponsored sunflower movement was it's obvious if PRC wanted TW back before 2049, or prior due to generational voting habits, they'd have to fight for it. It just so happens fighting may ultimately be the PRC quiet preferrable route since retaking TW peacefully doesn't displace US out of east Asia, only drawing US into TW conflict does. So yes, I disagree, I think US overplayed it's hand pretending it can intervene in TW, and legitimizes PRC reason for extended war, and will end my comments here since impasse.
Well, it’s a big unknown. Let me lay out briefly why that’s the case at least in my mind.
Let’s say you are China and you’ve decided to use your military forces to take Taiwan. You know if you are just facing Taiwan alone you’ll suffer losses and ships will get blown up, but you are ok with that. Glory to the CCP and all. Sorry about those semiconductors planet Earth. Those facilities will be obliterated.
But… the United States and Japan (the two most important partners here in my view) are allies and they aren’t officially allied with Taiwan but are happy to sell weapons and, maybe, and you’re unsure about this, just maybe if China invades Taiwan they may say that this isn’t acceptable to our national security and we will take action to intervene, but let’s say there’s nothing in the cards to attack the Chinese mainland (frankly neither the US or Japan really have an interest in doing that).
So now you are thinking ok, if it’s just us versus Taiwan that’s a piece of cake. But if the US and Japanese militaries intervene and defend Taiwan, maybe your potential success rate drops considerably, maybe to 60% or lower. That’s a problem. What can you do about it?
Well you could… declare that war will take place just in the Taiwan Straight and surrounding area and everyone else’s country is “off limits”. Escalation means chaos. The CCP is all about stability, 100-year old plans within plans and all that.
But if the US and Japan enter the war, you could sink the entire US Navy but they’d have free rein to safely fly in missiles and planes and equipment to their permanent aircraft carrier: Japan.
How long do you think it takes for China to attack a US military installation on Japan? And at that point, what really is the escalation for the US or Japanese to, idk, conduct a limited military operation to attack a Chinese Air Force base in response?
The whole situation, at least in my mind, is so dangerous because the escalatory ladder is fast and steep. What happens if a Chinese missile misses the US base and kills Japanese citizens? How long would Japan put up with a blockade (because you (China) of course have to stop the flow of munitions coming to defend Taiwan), or harassing of Japanese trading ships? If the US had an airbase in Korea or Japan or the Philippines or Guam or Australia and the Chinese blew it up and killed hundreds of US airmen, how short is the escalatory ladder from that to the US and Allies returning the favor on any Chinese military installation?
I was invited to lunch near factory 541, tank city, a pseudo closed area sprawled in some Shanxi valley. Turned out it was lunch and a show, they were going executing some drug traffickers from strike hard. Impromptu don't do drug lesson from uncle. We had to turn around because I had naturalized western citizenship and weird dialect by then and they figure security would not let us through. It was pretty surreal experience vs how nice and insular danwei life was otherwise.
Dollar dominance erosion shifting towards dollar inertia. Post RU sanctions dollar lost much of it's leverage (as geopolitical weapon), i.e. actual useful dominance function (transaction panopticon, sanctions)while still retaining most of the liability (Triffin etc). Dollar going to remain popular by volume because plumbing in place, but parallel payment systems last few years = systematic blindspots where US treasury can't monitor what others buy outside of dollar system, and generally weaker ability coerce countries. What's left of dollar system is US enjoying exorbitant privilege of going into ~35T and rapidly increasing debt to serve as asset for everyone else, while dragging down export via uncompetitive FX.
One interesting attack vector vs USD is PRC recycling it's dollar surplus / shadow lending it's USD reserves at more favorable rates than US gov can, i.e. countries (emerging markets / BRI recipients) who would have borrowed USD from FED (or US influenced IMF/WB) now borrow from USD from PRC -> reduce US treasuries demand and drive up US interest -> further increase US debt. PRC basically hijacked and weaponize USD liquidity to make increasingly ineffective dollar system (as geopolitical tool) even more expensive to maintain while PRC can enjoy dollar liquidity without the maintenance costs. And that's probably the ultimately the goal, smart play is not to inherit reserve obligations, but to turn reserve holder's exorbitant privilege to exorbitant curse.
> countries (emerging markets / BRI recipients) who would have borrowed USD from FED (or US influenced IMF/WB) now borrow from USD from PRC -> reduce US treasuries demand
This makes no sense. If the PRC is lending U.S. dollars, that doesn’t reduce Treasury demand. It increases demand for dollar-denominated assets, goods and service providers. The borrowing country has to spend those lent dollars after all.
PRC lending their USD surplus to countries to buy more PRC shit. "Increases demand for dollar-denominated assets, goods and service" =/= increase demand for US treasury, aka it doesn't fund US deficits. The attack is not on dollar circulation / liquidity but cost of treasury
Old: PRC recycle surplus USD into US bonds, increase US treasury demand, subsidizes cheap US debt.
New: PRC recycle surplus USD into BRI finance, said USD doesn't return to US treasury to buy bonds, decrease US treasury demand, treasury increase interest to fill hole, makes exorbitant privilege more exorbitant.
PRC parallel dollar bond lending COMPETES with US treasury bond lending. PRC dollars gets recycled towards PRC goods / BRI projects, not US treasury. PRC leveraging dollar liquidity for PRC geopolitical interests, meanwhile taking demand away from treasury bond sales, so US drive rates up to compete. US treasury had to find other buyers to fill ~600 billions (and raising) of USD bonds that PRC no longer holds. Filling hole that size = finding more price sensitive buyers (vs PRC who previously default recycled into treasury), so raise interest, increase debt servicing. US 10 year going from 0% (countries basically paying to hold USD) to ~0.8% cost US ~300B+ annually. Now that's not all PRC doing, but 100 billion here and there and soon we are talking about real money.
> attack is not on dollar circulation / liquidity but cost of treasury
No real way this can work between similarly-sized trading economies. Worst case, a couple central bankers' weekends would be ruined.
> PRC recycle surplus USD into BRI finance, said USD doesn't return to US treasury to buy bonds
How? PRC sends dollars into BRICS. What do they do with the dollars? If they aren't sitting on them, they're contributing to the dollar economy.
The PRC financing using dollars would be nuts because it puts their sovereign financing into American hands.
> PRC parallel dollar bond lending COMPETES with US treasury bond lending
Not in any meaningful way. (There aren't that many indisctiminate buyers of international debt anymore. Put another way, most Treasury buyers have and will never buy any Chinese paper and vice versa.)
> US treasury had to find other buyers to fill ~600 billions (and raising) of USD bonds that PRC no longer holds. Filling hole that size = finding more price sensitive buyers
Not really. You fire up the Fed. If it's China that's doing it, that's national security. Hell, sanction the accounts the dollars are going into.
> but 100 billion here and there and soon we are talking about real money
Have you traded Treasuries in an instituional setting? You're talking about the size of a single desk's intraday exposure.
Or you know, a few basis points increase in interest rate that adds up to 100s of billions of new debt obligations a year (now more than defense), but it's America, no one loses sleep over that.
>they do with the dollars
Sign PRC development contracts, which = PRC products. Not US treasury. Dollars circulating =/= dollars going into treasury to finance US solvency.
>meaningful way...
>aren't that many indiscriminate...
>single desk's intraday exposure
Churn =/= net absorption, liquidity =/= funding, which is 2T new issuance per year to cover deficit right now (speed =/= volume of plumbing). The exact vulnerability is not many indiscriminate buyers... and losing a whale like PBOC that was one of them, and their 100s of billions has outsized effect as marginal buyer that closed auction regardless of price. Now they've been replaced by price sensitive buyers which means FEDS raise rates to attract non indiscriminate buyers who buy for yield/valuation not storage to close auctions. Meanwhile PRC lending out their USD which further decrease demand for treasury. Instead of exorbitant privilege of cheap debt, treasury payouts closer and closer to market rate because indiscriminate price takers like PRC out. Structural cost of capital increases when debt velocity and refinancing reach fiscal trap levels.
>using dollars would be nuts
>national security
I mean it's happening, lots of PRC loans / shadow lending / swaplines backed up by their dollars, because it's better for PRC use them to further PRC interests than subsidize US debt. What's national security crisis? PRC not using dollars to buy treasury? AKA US going to announce to world surplus USD now must be mandatory recycled/loaned to US gov or be sanctioned? Are they going to sanction countries for buying PRC tractors and end up increasing USD risk premium even more? The virtue of mechanism is PRC is sustaining US dollar system (which Trumps seems to like, i.e. threaten to sanction countries who goes off), but incrementally stripping dollar strength into liability. There's shit all US can do about it without looking even more delulu and making system worse (granted for everyone). US/Trump still gets to see the privilege of dollar liquidity/churn/circulation, but now they have to pay through the nose for it because PRC marginal buyer not there to keep interest floor down.
Could you explain what do BRICS do with dollars they borrowed from PRC? Buy oil and so the dollars flow to SA. Then what do BRICS do when the dollars loan to PRC is due?
It's not limited to BRICs but many emerging economies or distressed countries PRC wants to gain influence. Dollars attached to specific PRC projects, i.e. BRI, so they buy PRC industrial inputs, goods, equipment, contracts PRC SEOs to build XYZ. It goes from a Chinese bank to a Chinese contractor who buys other shit. But the shit they are not buying is US treasuries, and even if they did, not at PBoC/central bank for storage low yield rates that subsidizes US debt. Sometimes there's more generalized debt servicing swaplines, but regardless When dollars come due, PRC can take rmb/commodities/assets (rarely aka debt trap). If borrowing countries payback in USD, then cycle repeats. PRC is basically exploiting UDS network / liquidity effects without paying exorbitant privilege. Well they do pay, as in they take on lending risks, but their USD reserve is inherently not safe anymore post RU sanctions, so might as well as use it now.
TBH the fact renewables haven't or can't cut big cheques to change Trumps mind is a little baffling. Surely he can double dip from big oil and small renewable.
Or surely PRC should get all the praise for diffusing geopolitical traps UK like to leave whenever they lose a colony. Patton threw a curve ball right before handover to last minute liberalize HK a little to hold onto influence, something they didn't do under UK rule. Of course it was geopolitical trap to make PRC look bad if they ever decide take away from HK what UK never provided, but PRC managed to do it anyway and most of world, i.e. global south got example that it is possible to excise legacy colonial tumors from declining empires who choose not to pass gracefully.
I have no idea how you came to the conclusion that liberalization (giving ever so slightly more freedom) would increase foreign UK influence post handover.
Yes, it shows. 11th hour liberalization was the spiked punch that subverted/prevented PRC from doing useful reforms, like (patriotic) education (MNE / moral national education in 2010s), getting rid of colonial british textbooks that koolaid generations of minds and tethered them to muh anglo liberal values, libtards that would later collude with foreign powers to sanction their own gov. Instead PRC had to waste 20 years unwinding the shitshow because they didn't want to rock the boat too hard during period of heightened end of history wank, i.e. didn't want to risk unrolling last minute landmine reforms which could lead to sanctions / capital flight.
Then there's liberalization bullshit like court of final appeal (staffed with overseas anglo "judges", read compradors, friendly to UK values and interests) that replaced UK privy council to enshrine liberal, UK aligned, rulings vs Beijing. Under colonial UK rule, privy council, decision makers in London, got to overrule HK local moves that countered UK interest. Or Legco reforms that enabled direct elections / local veto that didn't exist prior, which stalled art 23 / NSL implementation for 20 years, something Beijing would have otherwise been able to ram through using old colonial system where governor or Beijing equivalent get to rubber stamp whatever the fuck they wanted... like NSL. Or retooling societies ordinance, public order ordinance, bill of rights ordinance, that was previously used by UK crush dissenting groups with absolute power/prejudice into liberal instruments that now allow retooled ordinance to proliferate with greater judicial power over PRC appointed executive vs pre 90s when these were all tools UK executives used to crush dissent. Liberalization took away all the fancy authoritarian killswitch UK used to rule HK as colony with iron fist.
Post NSL, PRC gave all the compromised none-Chinese judges the boot and get to designate PRC aligned judges that rule on PRC interests. Nature is healing etc.
reply