No, it's still about security, in a defense-in-depth sense. Even if your trusting CA's in this context they all count as attack surface: CAA helps minimize it. For example, it's possible that a CA's validation process has a flaw. A CAA record may isolate you from that.
Even the "corporate policies" is a security thing, not "making someone's job easier". Presumably Facebook handles their certificates carefully: if any engineer could obtain certificates the odds that they would and that the certificates would be passed around in email attachments is 100%.
Speaking of defense-in-depth. I don't understand why do certificates released by public CAs not add an extension to the cert if the cert was given to a DNSSEC validated host.
As browsers are unwilling to validate DNSSEC directly it would allow browsers to just check the certificate. This could be complemented with a relevant HTTP header that forces the browser to only accept the certificate if it has been given out to DNSSEC validated host.
Even the "corporate policies" is a security thing, not "making someone's job easier". Presumably Facebook handles their certificates carefully: if any engineer could obtain certificates the odds that they would and that the certificates would be passed around in email attachments is 100%.