It's a different car, but still arguably a safer one. Every part in the 737 MAX is either the same or newer and improved over the previous 737 series. While they should have gone through far more scrutiny in the certification process, the 737 MAX, viewed holistically, is a newer, more modern aircraft that will be safer than older aircraft once the kinks are fixed.
Every time you change part of a system, even if you claim you're "improving" it, you introduce risk. That is my holistic view of this aircraft: the 737's record is not meaningless but it is also far from the whole picture for the MAX. Any new system introduces the potential for defects that were not present on previous models, and for unanticipated integration issues with existing systems.
Add in the facts that Boeing has been caught red-handed implementing a half-baked engineering solution as a regulatory dodge, and that this solution has to date crashed two aircraft and killed 346 (IIRC) people, and your view starts to look downright naive. You might call these tragedies "working out the kinks"; I call them wholly preventable, and evidence that human lives don't carry the proper weight in Boeing's financial calculus.
Which is to say, early defects in construction which were later resolved is not actually wholly uncommon to just this aircraft line, and planes of that model are still literally flying around today.
I'm not sure why you think I wouldn't be aware of those well-known facts about the 737.
I'm also not sure why you'd reply to my comment when you clearly either haven't read it or have no interest in actually replying to the substance of it.
I get that you're rightfully upset at Boeing for trying to skip the proper regulatory testing processes. I am too. But you are not meaningfully contesting my point, that a fixed 737 MAX is a safer aircraft to be flying in.
What would you suggest? Mothballing the MAX line for a wholly new aircraft? Arguably the MAX has significant flight testing time in production, to which one defect was found and is being remedied. A new aircraft would have less testing comparatively, and as noted, older aircraft really aren't inherently safer, as the 737's history shows.
My point was that the MAX will likely be the safest choice to fly in, and I don't think you offered up any logical argument saying otherwise.
I would suggest a fine-toothed audit of every single change made in the MAX aircraft, with particular attention paid to whether said changes were made solely in the interest of skirting regulations to sell more planes faster.
Because that is the point: Boeing's decision-making process is now highly suspect. It is pretty clear that the MCAS would not exist in anything like its current (flawed) form if Boeing hadn't been trying to avoid the pilot retraining requirement.
This is not a typical life-cycle for an engineering defect/flaw.
Hell no, I'll take Airbus or any other manufacturer over this crapware any day, even if I have to pay extra for the tickets. Boeing lost any trust in how they handled this, for very, very long time.
This topic is currently way beyond pure engineering issue, most human beings including me consider morality as quite an important aspect for example.
Unless I hear about some significant and measurable shift in the way company thinks and operates regarding to safety (nothing in the PR stuff discussed here), its a shady company with profits-above-safety mentality. No, thank you I can vote with my money
The parts that are the same can easily be a problem. Take, for instance, the emergency exits (this was about getting the NG certified in Japan almost 25 years ago BTW):
Like putting a very big engine in a small car: it’s a different car.