Is there a high-pitched sound, or not? If the people in power say there's no high-pitched sound, and the people out of power are suffering from the high-pitched sound, what is "true"? There is "a truth," or "two truths," but not "the truth."
The ideal of polite conversion is that people who disagree can come to a conclusion, a "truth," that was previously inaccessible to either of them. Asserting "the truth," is a dominator paradigm privilege.
And yet, in your opening paragraph, you described "the truth". "The truth" would be that a percentage of population complains about a certain sound while the remainder of the population doesn't. You might even be able to describe physical properties of that sound, such as the range of frequencies and the amplitude that produces discomfort in a given proportion of population. You might even be able to describe the characteristics of populations that respond to the sound differently (such as, I don't know, socioeconomic status for whatever reason). That would probably bring you as close to "the truth" as possible. Whether the sound in question is called "high-pitched" or not is irrelevant.
It irks me that subjective claims about the physical world are regarded as truth statements about the physical world, and thus my report that I hear a displeasing sound and your report that you don't hear that sound or don't find it displeasing somehow produces two "truths".
Get an audio sensor that covers the frequency range in question. It isn't rocket science, people. There is in fact "the truth", that is, what corresponds to actual reality, and it's completely independent of how many people say they hear the sound and how many do not. (Those are also "truths", but they are not "the truth".) Once you know whether the sound really exists as audio energy in the air, then you can tell the difference between "X% of people can't hear high frequencies" and "100-X% of people suffer from tinnitus or audio hallucinations".
You're being too literal. There are lots of "sounds" that have no objective correlates at all. What do we do with those [conflicting] subjective "truths" when there is no meter?
First, azangru was talking about "statements about the physical world". For that kind of statement, if there is no objective correlate, then you're kind of in a quantum "many worlds" vs. "collapse" situation. That is, people have opinions, but it produces no actual physical difference which one is true, and many people have concluded that the dispute is both unproveable and pointless.
And if we're talking about something that isn't physical, I suggest that it's still the same. If there is no objective correlate, then... let people have their opinions, but don't label either side "truth".
> If the people in power say there's no high-pitched sound, and the people out of power are suffering from the high-pitched sound, what is "true"?
How is the power of the speaker relevant to the truth of what they are saying?
Would the presence of a high pitched sound change if the people in power say there /is/ a high-pitched sound, and the people out of power say it doesn't exist?
The way we find truth is to measure the sound, rather than to pay undue attention to anecdotal evidence to one party based on identity.
I understand that the essay isn’t about deciding what is true (I.e: is there a pitch or not?), instead it’s about the fact that a group blinds itself from asking or even considering that there could be a high pitch. Because they don’t experience it, and in their reality nobody seem to experience it (orthodoxie) they can dismiss any allegation of a pitch, or will ask for evidence that cannot be produced (though that’s were the analogy fails here).
I found this such a bizarre analogy (responding to pg's point, not directly to you). There can be meaningful difference of opinion and perception on whether or not a sound exists; people literally might not have the physiological equipment to hear it. However, the assertion that "there are things I can't say" (meaning, presumably, "there are things I will experience significant hardship for saying" rather than literally "… things I am physically incapable of saying") is surely proveable by mentioning such a thing. He dismisses this idea, but seems never to explain why he's dismissing it, other than by this analogy, which to me seems false.
If the answer to why you can't say what things can't be said is that merely specifically mentioning their existence brings on the unspeakable consequences, then I would say further: I find it perfectly possible to refer to and defend the right of freedom of speech by defending the expression of ideas with which I vehemently disagree. Hopefully Nazism is a safe enough bugbear to assume that every reasonable person disagrees with it. And yet I think Nazis should be able to speak, and at the same time that they should experience the consequences of that speech; and I feel safe in saying that no-one here will confuse my saying that with support or defence of Nazism. So why can't one of these things that can't be said similarly be named without supporting it?
To carry it even one step further, I agree that, if someone says that there's a high-pitched noise and I don't hear it, then it is rude to deny that they hear anything. But is it rude to ask them what it sounds like (for example, does it sound like something I can hear?), or if they can identify where it comes from, or if they hear it all the time? Maybe that falls under the category of 'demanding' evidence that pg says is rude, but it seems to me to be rather a gathering of evidence that I think is the sort of activity highly valued in this community.
The ideal of polite conversion is that people who disagree can come to a conclusion, a "truth," that was previously inaccessible to either of them. Asserting "the truth," is a dominator paradigm privilege.