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Yes, the blog author has created such a hand-crafted URL, but note that the callback url in the attack's url is to a harvestapp domain, and the attacker controlled portion is in the state, which is pretty much opaque to the oauth server.

That url allows you to link someone to a login.microsoftonline.com link, have a login prompt show up that says "login to harvestapp", and then have the attacker be able to gain permissions related to your real harvestapp account.

Normally, this would not be possible. The attacker with example.com could register a new app that does redirect to example.com, but that would not give them an access token with permissions related to harvestapp, so it would not be useful.

The oauth app, on microsoft's end, has a whitelist of valid redirects, so an attempt to do something like "login.microsoftonline.com/authorize?client_id=$harvestAppID&redirect_uri=attacker.com" will error out on microsoft's side, since that is not a valid redirect uri to receive an access token.

The attack is only possible because there's a valid "outlook-integration.harvestapp.com" URL, which receives the access token, but then also redirects to the attacker's site and gives them the access token too.



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