The early precedents were things like delegating to the customs department lists of items for tariff schedules. Virtually all the precedent reallocating the power to make law was upheld under the threat of court packing in the 1930s and is suspect and ripe for revisiting.
> When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones: "Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the political branches."
* https://constitution.findlaw.com/article1/annotation03.html
It's not a new idea that some ambiguities are left to the Executive to figure out.
The Chevron decision was basically a codification of what had been done for decades before it.