I find that this has much more promise than all the crap about Secure Boot and the like for the far-fetched "evil maid" scenario. NO ONE I know is going to react to Windows going batshit and requesting the Bitlocker key for no reason as "my laptop has been tampered with!". Heck, given large enough number of employees, IT has to hand out the bitlocker keys almost every day due to how frequent false positives are.
On the other hand, I'd think they'd pay attention to actual tampering evidence.
Yeah, Secure Boot/Measured Boot is also needed to resist against persistent compromise in the virtual world, which is arguably much more problematic and has a much longer history of actual application in the wild. Chromebooks for example are designed so that even with a full system wide exploit that compromises the kernel, a reboot will return the system to a consistent and uncompromised state.
(An interesting parallel is in the mobile ecosystem where things like untethered jailbreaks, i.e. persistent ones, for high end targets are nearly non-existent. Similarly, existing attacks from things like Cellebrite for high-end devices like Pixel/iPhones are generally classified in terms of things like whether they are vulnerable before or after first unlock of the device where boot chain security is strongest, and there's nearly nothing in terms of persistent compromise, downgrade/replay attacks, etc.)
Measured Boot maybe, but Secure Boot is not for that -- e.g. if your attackers can compromise your running Windows system (or e.g. your $HOME in Linux) the attack surface for spyware they can leave without any reasonable person noticing is HUGE.
On the other hand, I'd think they'd pay attention to actual tampering evidence.