Can that also help with the emanations security issue where an adversary might be able to extract usable data from the audio produced by the electronic components?
The noise would correlate with load, but this is the least of your worries.
Unless you have a proper RF testing lab and skilled EMC engineers at your disposal, the only thing you can do is stuff everything into a properly designed faraday cage.
The usable data would just be "DC-DC converter is on/off". In theory, if the converter uses a variable frequency or duty cycle, you might be able to extract some information about that too. But that's not very interesting.
A DC-DC converter always uses a variable duty cycle to maintain the target output voltage (or for CC, current). Without it, the voltage would vary wildly depending on load.
For something like an audio amplifier, obtaining precise power supply load would in turn give you a curve over amplifier load, which effectively gives you the speaker amplitude. Input caps and filtering will likely remove the high frequency components entirely, but you might be able to construct at least part of the played waveform.
All good points. I would say that it's a fairly outlandish scenario where you are (i) close enough to the device to listen to the caps whining but (ii) can't measure actual voltages within the circuit (which could be a lot more informative) and (iii) can't just listen to the audio output of the device directly.
Acoustic noise is one thing, but it's not at all outlandish to be within range of the EMI emitted from the same power supply which tells the same tale. What is outlandish is thinking anyone bothers listening in. :)
TEMPEST and other side-channel hardening is hard to do if you lack access to anechoic/RF isolated chambers, sensitive scopes/microphones and knowledge.
yes, but the audio usually doesn't travel as far as the rf; you'd almost have to be in a situation where the adversary can't put equipment near you but has managed to subvert a microphone
