Lmao, so you either collect less money, or you collect enough money to pay for your new dividend + other government services. you cant have it both ways.
You must account for the cost of the random new UBI you addressed to cover your other arguments.
>You have to sit on a lot of valuable land to have a high LVT bill. Those are rich people.
This is one of my favourite parts of LVT, the magically tiny tax.
If you take <national budget> and apply it proportionally across land as it is valued, the most <national budget> is extracted from inner city residential and commercial land. This is literally the stated intention.
You have stopped caring about a persons income, and started caring only about the value of the land beneath their house. By design and intention.
That value will rise and fall based on subjective third party determinations. By design and intention.
Its highly likely that people will end up with a significantly increased tax bill, especially if they had low/no income previously. Again this is stated intention, its just the flip side of encouraging more efficient use, is discouraging people from living within their means on a block of land they own that's near things property evaluators value.
Rich people with high incomes and expensive property wont give a shit. People who fall outside of your hypothetical, plenty of whom exist lots of them former income tax payers, will be significantly worse off.
>By itself, acquiring all the land will be fiscally neutral
Land value as it stands is fucked in large part because the government holds so much of it. The solution is to release more land, not lock more of it up in state ownership.
>I know, it's a bit confusing: we are charging a specific rate on the price of the land, but what we are actually interested in is the proportion of land rent we are capturing.
You need to solve for the entire budget, not a number you made up.
The market cap of the US housing market is 50 trillion. That includes developments on the land, and it excludes all the commercial and agricultural land. Lets assume it averages out to 60 trillion.
US government spent 6.8 trillion last year.
You aren't going to be able to tax rents 10%, you will need to tax value 10% to reach that number.
If someone lives in a caravan sitting on a 200k valued piece of land that they own outright (hoping to develop one day), making minimum wage, and they get a tax bill for 20k, or even 10 or 5k their life just ended. If you want them to borrow with no income to offset their tax, they wont get that loan.
I dont understand how you dont understand the actual cost of an LVT or how it is likely to affect people.
> (In taxation and income, medians tend to be lower than averages, so the above system would leave money left over to use for general government revenue. If you want more of that, instead of paying the median amount, you could pay UBI at eg the 20%-ile level. That would still protect those people who only 'have 1 good thing going' from net outflowing payments.)
The less UBI you pay, the more you have left over for general government revenue. The more UBI you pay, the less you have left over for general government revenue.
> Land value as it stands is fucked in large part because the government holds so much of it. The solution is to release more land, not lock more of it up in state ownership.
It doesn't really matter, as long as they lease it out to the highest bidder.
> Its highly likely that people will end up with a significantly increased tax bill, especially if they had low/no income previously. Again this is stated intention, its just the flip side of encouraging more efficient use, is discouraging people from living within their means on a block of land they own that's near things property evaluators value.
LVT does not encourage (or discourage) any land use, efficient or otherwise. It makes no change to opportunity costs between different uses.
> You need to solve for the entire budget, not a number you made up.
I have no clue what you are on about?
If you want a clear suggestion of what I would prefer:
Auction off all the plots of land for eg 30 years at a time. Do the auction for the next lease 5 years before the old lease ends. Stagger the auctions to have around 0.28% of plots being auctioned off every month.
(Don't bother with UBI etc, unless you want UBI for other reasons anyway. Those were just suggestions to solve specific concerns about orphans and widows you brought up. I would suggest to just use the regular, existing means-tested social safety net for them, instead of spinning up something bespoke.)
Singapore does something reasonably similar, but I think 99 year leases are too long, especially since the country is young enough that the giving back at the end of leases has essentially never been tested.
I'm not sure why you bring up the US government spending? I don't know how much LVT could raise in the US. But some people have tried to figure that one out.
> If someone lives in a caravan sitting on a 200k valued piece of land that they own outright (hoping to develop one day), making minimum wage, and they get a tax bill for 20k, or even 10 or 5k their life just ended. If you want them to borrow with no income to offset their tax, they wont get that loan.
That's fine. They can sell the land to get rid of those hopes and dreams and tax obligations.
You can write similar sob stories about any tax at all. And most are worse than what you get with LVT.
With an established LVT, your caravan dweller would never get this weird idea in the first place.
And I admit that whenever you make an adjustment to the tax system, the people who made plans based on the previous system will have those plans torpedoed. Them's the breaks.
So we have to decide what we want to discuss: how an LVT system would work in the steady state, or how we could (or could not) transition to one.
Lmao, so you either collect less money, or you collect enough money to pay for your new dividend + other government services. you cant have it both ways.
You must account for the cost of the random new UBI you addressed to cover your other arguments.
>You have to sit on a lot of valuable land to have a high LVT bill. Those are rich people.
This is one of my favourite parts of LVT, the magically tiny tax.
If you take <national budget> and apply it proportionally across land as it is valued, the most <national budget> is extracted from inner city residential and commercial land. This is literally the stated intention.
You have stopped caring about a persons income, and started caring only about the value of the land beneath their house. By design and intention.
That value will rise and fall based on subjective third party determinations. By design and intention.
Its highly likely that people will end up with a significantly increased tax bill, especially if they had low/no income previously. Again this is stated intention, its just the flip side of encouraging more efficient use, is discouraging people from living within their means on a block of land they own that's near things property evaluators value.
Rich people with high incomes and expensive property wont give a shit. People who fall outside of your hypothetical, plenty of whom exist lots of them former income tax payers, will be significantly worse off.
>By itself, acquiring all the land will be fiscally neutral
Land value as it stands is fucked in large part because the government holds so much of it. The solution is to release more land, not lock more of it up in state ownership.
>I know, it's a bit confusing: we are charging a specific rate on the price of the land, but what we are actually interested in is the proportion of land rent we are capturing.
You need to solve for the entire budget, not a number you made up.
The market cap of the US housing market is 50 trillion. That includes developments on the land, and it excludes all the commercial and agricultural land. Lets assume it averages out to 60 trillion.
US government spent 6.8 trillion last year.
You aren't going to be able to tax rents 10%, you will need to tax value 10% to reach that number.
If someone lives in a caravan sitting on a 200k valued piece of land that they own outright (hoping to develop one day), making minimum wage, and they get a tax bill for 20k, or even 10 or 5k their life just ended. If you want them to borrow with no income to offset their tax, they wont get that loan.
I dont understand how you dont understand the actual cost of an LVT or how it is likely to affect people.