A small team of skilled physicists relying only on public knowledge can design a nuclear weapon (and did, back in 1964; their work product was classified, the demonstrated futility notwithstanding). The only reason that random grad students don't have the bomb is that enrichment of uranium requires state-level resources. So why focus on the easier part of building a nuclear weapon that they haven't undertaken, while choosing language ("lowering latency", not "building") that minimizes the much harder part that they have? This view is prevalent, but it seems exactly backwards to me.
As to intent, the concept of "deterrence, but never going over the edge" doesn't really exist--if you're never going over the edge, then where does the deterrence come from? At best it's a bluff, like threatening someone with an unloaded gun. But would you really want to bet your life that Iran has put maybe a quarter of their GDP (including sanctions impact; the program itself is much less) into a bluff? We can't read minds, and their costly actions seem like much more reliable signals than our guesses at their intent.
Switzerland is an odd comparison, since they got their capabilities in what they openly described as the initial stages of a nuclear weapons program. Since abandoning that, Switzerland has been divesting its enriched uranium. If Switzerland were instead building up its stockpile while funding proxies to (conventionally) strike its neighbors, then I'd expect some combination of sanctions and military action there too.
> As to intent, the concept of "deterrence, but never going over the edge" doesn't really exist--if you're never going over the edge, then where does the deterrence come from?
Exactly the same place as the deterrence in MAD. You don't intend to immediately nuke your geopolitical rivals when you build the bomb, you intend to sit around with a metaphorical shotgun aimed at your door for the rest of time.
> If Switzerland were instead building up its stockpile while funding proxies to (conventionally) strike its neighbors, then I'd expect some combination of sanctions and military action there too.
Sure, I agree. I approve of the strikes against Iran in principle. I still don't believe there's "no question" that Iran was going to build a nuclear weapon if nobody else intervened.
> You don't intend to immediately nuke your geopolitical rivals
I don't see why intent requires immediacy? Perhaps this becomes uselessly philosophical, but I would say MAD requires the defending state to intend to nuke its adversary, conditioned on some future event (a nuclear attack on themselves, an existential conventional attack, etc.). They hope that condition is never satisfied, but intend to strike if it is.
> I still don't believe there's "no question" that Iran was going to build a nuclear weapon if nobody else intervened.
For clarity, I don't believe that either. By "working actively towards", I mean only that Iran was taking costly steps that bring them closer to a working bomb, and no other rational purpose could justify those costs. I think the distinction of what such steps we count as "lowering latency" vs. "building a bomb" is arbitrary and mostly meaningless, since as the latency approaches zero the latter goal is effectively achieved.
I agree that Iran might just have been saber-rattling; or even if they currently intended to build and test a complete bomb, they might have discontinued the program before succeeding. I just don't think intent is a useful focus (vs. practical capabilities), since it's fundamentally unknowable and could change at any time.
As to intent, the concept of "deterrence, but never going over the edge" doesn't really exist--if you're never going over the edge, then where does the deterrence come from? At best it's a bluff, like threatening someone with an unloaded gun. But would you really want to bet your life that Iran has put maybe a quarter of their GDP (including sanctions impact; the program itself is much less) into a bluff? We can't read minds, and their costly actions seem like much more reliable signals than our guesses at their intent.
Switzerland is an odd comparison, since they got their capabilities in what they openly described as the initial stages of a nuclear weapons program. Since abandoning that, Switzerland has been divesting its enriched uranium. If Switzerland were instead building up its stockpile while funding proxies to (conventionally) strike its neighbors, then I'd expect some combination of sanctions and military action there too.